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INTRODUCTION
Mr. Donald Wagner, a professor at North Park University in Chicago,
refinanced his fixed rate mortgage in March of 2005 to assist his daughter
with her college tuition.1 Mr. Wagner‘s broker did not inform him that his
interest rate would rise dramatically only one month after refinancing.2 As
a result of his pay option adjustable rate mortgage,3 the principal of his loan
has increased by $15,000 over the last two and a half years.4 Mr. Wagner
has been forced to borrow against his pension and 401(k) in order to make
payments, and, to make matters worse, last summer he discovered that his
loan includes a $12,000 prepayment penalty.5 He now spends over sixty
percent of his income on his mortgage payment, and states, ―[I]t‘s only

Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide Subpoenaed by Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at C1.
Id.
―These loans allow borrowers to pay only a fraction of the interest owed and none of the principal, resulting in a growing rather than a shrinking mortgage balance.‖ Id. For further discussion of
negative amortization see infra Part I.B.6.
4 Morgenson, supra note 1.
5 Id. For further discussion of prepayment penalties, see infra Part I.B.4.
1
2
3
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[for] so long that I can do that.‖6 Unfortunately, Mr. Wagner‘s story is not
unique.7
Homeownership has long been the foundation of the American
Dream,8 but in recent years this dream has been cut short for many Americans.9 In 2006 there were over 1.2 million residential foreclosures across
the United States.10 That is more than one foreclosure per minute.11 This
was a dramatic rise from the number of foreclosures in 2005, and numbers
did not slow in 2007.12 In November of 2007 alone there were a total of
201,950 foreclosure filings, the equivalent of one foreclosure for every 617
households across the country, a sixty-eight percent increase from number
of foreclosures in November of 2006.13 An overwhelming number of these
foreclosures are attributable to subprime mortgages.14
It is estimated that ―[a]t least one out of five subprime loans will end
in foreclosure—representing the highest rate of U.S. foreclosures since the
Great Depression.‖15 These statistics prove that action needs to be taken in
Morgenson, supra note 1.
―Countrywide, the nation‘s largest mortgage lender and loan servicer, is coming under increased scrutiny as the home loan crisis deeps.‖ Id. The Illinois Attorney General recently subpoenaed
Countrywide documents ―as part of the state‘s expanding inquiry into dubious lending practices that
have trapped borrowers in high-cost mortgages they can no longer afford.‖ Id.
8 ―Owning a home has always been at the center of the American Dream.‖ George W. Bush,
President of the United States, President Bush Discusses Homeownership Financing, Address at the
Rose Garden, (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=2007_presidential_documents&docid=pd03se07_txt-23.pdf.
9 See Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep’s Clothing: A Legislative
Proposal, 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 129, 133 (2005).
10 ASS‘N OF CMTY. ORGS. FOR REFORM NOW, HOME INSECURITY: FORECLOSURES IN MIAMIDADE COUNTY NEIGHBORHOODS 2 (2007), available at http://acorn.org/fileadmin/Reports/FL_Miami_
Dade_County.pdf.
11 Id.
12 RealtyTrac, the publisher of the largest database of pre-foreclosure and foreclosures properties,
reports that in 2006, there were 1,259,118 residential foreclosures in the United States. This is ―up 42
percent from 2005 and [is at] a foreclosure rate of one foreclosure filing for every 92 U.S. households.‖
Press Release, RealtyTrac.com, More Than 1.2 Million Foreclosure Filings Reported in 2006, (Jan. 25,
2006), http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=1855
&accnt=64847; see also John W. Schoen, Spike in Foreclosures: Sen. Schumer Urges Federal Bailout
Worth ‘Hundreds of Millions’ of Dollars, MSNBC, Apr. 12, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
18059004/.
13 Press Release, Realtytrac.com, Foreclosure Activity Decreases 10 Percent in November (Dec.
19, 2007), http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=
3797.
14 A study published by the Center for Responsible Lending in December 2006, found that ―one
out of five (19 percent) subprime mortgages originated during the past two years [2005 and 2006] will
end in foreclosure.‖ ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME
MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS 3 (2006), available at http://www.responsible
lending.org/pdfs/foreclosure-paper-report-2-17.pdf.
15 Center for Responsible Lending, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, http://www.responsible
lending.org/issues/mortgage/subprime-mortgage-crisis.html (last visited April 5, 2008). The subprime
mortgage crisis has become so dire that, on January 10, 2008, Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, ―signaled the bank‘s willingness to lower interest rates to prevent housing and credit problems from causing a U.S. recession.‖ Lorrie Grant, Fed ‘Stands Ready’ to Avoid Economic Recession,
NPR.org, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17993667. Currently,
the Federal Reserve reports that ―[a]bout 21 percent of subprime adjustable rate mortgages are 90 days
or more delinquent, and foreclosure rates are rising sharply . . . .‖ Id. As a result, ―[s]ome 2 million
6
7
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order to cure the current foreclosure epidemic, and that steps must be taken
in order to prevent history from repeating itself in the future. Educating the
public in order to reform the subprime mortgage industry is not an entirely
new concept,16 but given the amount of foreclosures that took place in 2006
and 2007, and those looming on the not so distant horizon, it is time that
this idea is revisited.17
Foreclosures directly impact the lives of the families‘ whose homes
are being foreclosed,18 and cause these families severe emotional and financial trauma.19 ―For most homeowners, equity in a home represents a
significant bulk of the resources accumulated over a lifetime.‖20 The damaging effects of foreclosures are also experienced by the community as a
whole.21 Increased foreclosures can transform a once thriving community
into an abandoned area.22 If there is a concentration of foreclosures in a
single community the result is ―a decrease in overall property values, an increase in crime, and a corresponding need for greater law enforcement and
other government services.‖23 Due to these negative consequences assohomeowners are due to have their adjustable rate mortgages, or ARMs, reset over the next year and risk
losing their homes.‖ Id.
16 See Stark, supra note 9, at 130.
17 On September 18, 2007, RealtyTrac reported that, in August 2007, there were 239,851 foreclosure filings. This number is 37 percent higher than July of 2007, and 112 percent higher than August of
2006. ―This is the highest number of foreclosure filings in a single month that RealtyTrac has reported
since it began issuing the monthly report in January of 2005.‖ Press Release, RealtyTrac.com, Foreclosure Activity Increases 37 Percent in August (Sept. 8, 2007), http://www.realtytrac.com/Content
Management/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=3222&accnt=64847. James J. Saccacio, RealtyTrac‘s CEO commented, ―The jump in foreclosure filings this month might be the beginning of the
next wave of increased foreclosure activity, as a large number of subprime adjustable rate loans are beginning to reset now.‖ Id.
18 ―[A] predatory loan that results in a foreclosure can be a devastating event in the life of an individual subprime borrower.‖ Siddhartha Venkatesan, Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine
in Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL‘Y 177, 208 (2003).
19 Baher Azmy & David Reiss, Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey
Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 645, 663 (2004); Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due
Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 503, 581 (2002).
20 Venkatesan, supra note 18, at 208. ―[H]omes represent Americans‘ largest financial asset . . . .‖ Nathalie Martin & Ocean Tama y Sweet, Mind Games: Rethinking BAPCPA’s Debtor Education Provisions, 31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 517, 521 (2007).
21 Venkatesan, supra note 18, at 208; Eggert, supra note 19, at 582; Azmy & Reiss, supra note
19, at 663. ―Whole communities have been adversely affected by the phenomenon of predatory lending
because aggressive mortgage brokers target specific neighborhoods within which to market these highcost home loans, and the subsequent foreclosures in these areas have led to rows of boarded up homes
being inhabited by gangs and drug dealers.‖ Stark, supra note 9, at 130.
22 See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 663.
23 Id. ―Neighborhoods become vulnerable . . . . Abandoned homes become targets for drug dealers and arson. . . . The need for police and fire services rises in relation to neighborhood decline, further
burdening city resources. The increased costs for city services directly affects the proprietary interests
of cities.‖ Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 375–76 (2006). In August of 2007, over 18,000 jobs in the mortgage
industry were cut due to the meltdown in the subprime sector. David Ellis, Job Cuts from Subprime:
18,000 and Counting, CNNMONEY, Aug. 23, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/22/news/
economy/subprime_layoffs/index.htm. Some economists predict that additional job losses will be seen
in housing-related industries. Home Depot ―blamed the housing-market softness and turmoil in the
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ciated with foreclosures, and the recent increase in the sheer number of foreclosures taking place, there is a dire need for the federal government to
enact legislation that will give consumers the ability to protect themselves
from the types of home loans that most often lead to foreclosure.24
The federal government should enact legislation requiring borrowers
to participate in a consumer education program before borrowers can
commit to loans containing adjustable interest rates,25 prepayment penalties,26 balloon payments,27 that does or has the potential to negatively
amortize,28 or where points and fees will be financed along with the principal.29 These terms, once mainly attributed to predatory loans, are now
prevalent in many of today‘s subprime loans.30 It has been argued that
―[p]redatory lending is made possible by inadequate information, or, in
technical jargon, asymmetric information held by lenders and borrowers
. . . . Predatory lending would not exist, or would be relatively rare, if prospective borrowers understood the true nature of their loan contracts.‖31
Logically, it seems to follow that the use of loan terms typically associated
with predatory lending are also present in subprime loans due to unequal
knowledge possessed by borrowers and lenders.32 Providing borrowers
with this education would give them the tools needed to correctly assess
risks associated with these terms and allow them to make informed decisions. Furthermore, pre-purchase mortgage counseling has been shown to
reduce the number of delinquent mortgage payments.33
Part I of this Comment explores prime, subprime and predatory loans,
lays out why securitization has played a large role in the recent dramatic
increase in subprime loans, and discusses blurring of the distinction between legitimate subprime and predatory loans. Part II continues with an
subprime market for its drop in second-quarter profits.‖ Id. General Motors also cites a weakened
housing market for the reduced demand for their ―full-size pickup trucks and SUVs.‖ Id. As a result,
General Motors has cut back on overtime available for its plant employees. Id. ―Problems could spread
to other retail segments, warns John Silvia, chief economist with Wachovia. Consumers faced with
high interest rate mortgages are likely to cut back on spending. Without customers, retailers could be
forced to trim their headcount.‖ Id.
24 Though there is a need for the federal government to address foreclosures currently taking
place, the purpose of this Comment is how to prevent this type of foreclosure epidemic from taking
place again in the future.
25 An adjustable rate mortgage, or ARM, is a mortgage where the interest rate will change periodically over the life of the loan. HUD.gov, Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM): What is an ARM?,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/ins/203armt.cfm (last visited April 5, 2008). See infra Part I.B.1.
26 See infra Part I.B.4.
27 See infra Part I.B.5.
28 See infra Part I.B.6.
29 See infra Part I.B.2.
30 See infra Part I.
31 Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Remarks at the Fair Housing Council of New York, Syracuse,
New York (Apr. 14, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/Speeches/2000/
200004142.htm.
32 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
33 ABDIGHANI HIRAD & PETER M. ZORN, A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE IS A GOOD THING: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRE-PURCHASE HOMEOWNERSHIP COUNSELING (2001), available
at http://freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/pdf/homebuyers_study.pdf.
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assessment of the current federal legislation in place to help protect borrowers from predatory lending practices. Next, Part III surveys North Carolina, New Jersey and Illinois‘ predatory lending laws, all of which require
consumer education for certain loans, and considers the success of these
laws. This Comment then moves to propose a consumer education requirement when specific terms are included in a mortgage and discusses
how to implement this requirement in Part IV, recommending that lenders
be required to show proof that a borrower has completed the mandatory
consumer education before the lender is allowed to securitize the borrower‘s loan. This Comment concludes with the story of Mr. Alvaro Cortez, a
man who benefited from Illinois‘ consumer education requirement, and
proves that consumer education can help in the fight against abusive loan
terms which lead to foreclosure.
I. AS TIME HAS PASSED, THE LEGITIMATE SUBPRIME MARKET
HAS TAKEN ON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PREDATORY MARKET,
BLURRING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO
Not long ago, there were ―three markets for home mortgages: a prime
market, a legitimate subprime market, and a predatory market.‖34 The
prime market35 is, and always has been, for borrowers who have good credit histories and present relatively low risks of defaulting on their loans.36
The legitimate subprime market made credit available for people who generally had lower credit scores37 or for other reasons could not qualify for a
prime mortgage.38 Since these borrowers had less than perfect credit, lend34 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002).
35 ―‗Prime‘ loans are those made to ‗low-risk borrowers with strong credit histories.‘‖ David J.
Weiner, Comment, Assignee Liability in State Predatory Lending Laws: How Uncapped Punitive Damages Threaten The Secondary Mortgage Market, 55 EMORY L.J. 535, 538 (2006) (quoting Engel &
McCoy, supra note 34, at 1258). Because prime loans are made to borrowers with good credit histories,
mortgage lenders actually compete to offer the best rates and terms to borrowers. Id. ―This competition
has resulted in constantly evolving, innovative loan products as well as sophisticated, automated underwriting processes. These advances . . . have led to the widespread availability of funds for prime
borrowers.‖ Id. at 538–39.
36 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1258.
37 Credit scores are how most lenders assess the risk of a particular loan. Most lenders look at a
borrower‘s FICO score, a credit score developed by Fair Issac Corporation. Each borrower actually has
three FICO scores, one for each of the three credit bureaus—Experian, TransUnion and Equifax. A
borrower‘s FICO score is based on the following factors, and their relative weight to the overall score is
indicated in parentheses: payment history (35%), amounts owed (30%), length of credit history (15%),
new credit (10%), and types of credit used (10%). FICO scores affect the amounts that lenders are willing to lend and on what terms they are willing to do so.
MyFICO.com, http://www.
myfico.com/CreditEducation (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
38 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1258; see also Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 650–51 (―A
subprime loan is typically intended to extend credit to a borrower who, for reasons such as a poor credit
record, high debt-to-income ratio, or unstable employment history, cannot qualify for a conventional or
prime mortgage loan.‖). The legitimate subprime mortgage market ―provides a source of funds for credit-impaired borrowers and other borrowers that are unable to obtain credit in the prime market.‖
DEPTS. OF TREASURY & HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE
LENDING 27 (2000), http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/curbing.html [hereinafter CURBING].
The subprime market also extends credit to ―creditworthy borrowers with variable or hard-to-document
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ers believed that they were more likely to default on their loans.39 In order
to compensate for this increased risk, subprime lenders have traditionally
charged higher interest rates.40 The predatory mortgage market has been
described as a subset that grew out of the subprime mortgage market.
Though most predatory lending takes place within the subprime market,41
predatory loans are distinct from legitimate subprime loans.42 Predatory
lenders target borrowers ―who, because of historical credit rationing, discrimination, and other social and economic forces, are disconnected from
the credit market.‖43 Predatory loans typically exhibit two or more of the
following qualities: (1) terms that can result in great harm to borrowers,44
(2) excessive points and fees,45 (3) fraudulent or deceptive lending practices,46 (4) lack of transparency,47 and (5) borrowers‘ waiver of ―meaningful
legal redress.‖48 The subprime mortgage market has rapidly grown in recent years and now many subprime loans exhibit the qualities that were
once mainly associated with predatory lending.
A.

The Boom in Subprime Lending Led to the Birth of the Predatory
Market

The subprime mortgage industry has experienced tremendous growth
since the mid-1990s. In 1994, the subprime industry accounted for only
$35 billion of the nation‘s loans originated that year,49 and by 2005 it had
grown to $665 billion.50 The explosion in the subprime market can be attributed to a number of factors, but most scholars agree that securitization
income. A subprime mortgage may be a first mortgage (for either purchasing a home or refinancing an
existing mortgage), a second mortgage, or a home equity line of credit.‖ Id. at 26.
39 A common characteristic of subprime lending is higher risk. ―Lenders experience higher loan
defaults and losses by subprime borrowers than by prime borrowers.‖ CURBING, supra note 38, at 27.
40 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 651 (―Studies have estimated that subprime loans have on
average a two and a half to four percentage points higher interest rate than prime loans.‖). Subprime
loans also tend to have higher points and fees because of the higher origination and servicing costs associated with these loans. Id.
41 ―Predatory lending generally occurs in the subprime mortgage market . . . .‖ CURBING, supra
note 38, at 1.
42 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1261; Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 650.
43 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1279.
44 Id. at 1260, 1261–65. These terms include but are not limited to lending without considering
the borrower‘s ability to repay the loan, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and negative amortization.
45 Id. at 1260, 1265–67.
46 Id. at 1260, 1267–68.
47 Id. at 1260, 1268–70.
48 Id. at 1260, 1270.
49 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 651–52.
50 SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at 7. By 2006, outstanding subprime loans ―account[ed] for about
14 percent of all first-lien mortgages.‖ Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve System, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago‘s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition, Chicago, Illinois (May 17, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm. ―Subprime mortgages made up 22% of new loans in
2005, compared to 8% in 2003 . . . .‖ How We Got into the Subprime Lending Mess, KNOWLEDGE@
WHARTON, Sept. 19, 2007, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1812 [hereinafter
Lending Mess].

DE TAL

640

11/10/2008 3:04 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 11:633

of subprime loans for their sale to third-party investors has been the driving
force behind the market‘s rapid growth.51 Securitization,52 increased availability of diverse mortgage products, and increased incentives to lend to
people with low and moderate incomes have all been cited as reasons that
led to the birth of the predatory lending market.53 The rapid growth in the
subprime market has also lead to a rapid growth in predatory lending, and
now many subprime loans exhibit the qualities that were once only found
in predatory loans.
B.

Characteristics of the Predatory Market Adopted by the Subprime
Market

The term ―predatory loan‖ is extremely malleable, and there is no single widely accepted definition.54 Occasionally, authors describe predatory
loans as, ―‗a mismatch between the needs and capacity of the borrower,‘
which results in a loan with terms so disadvantageous to a particular borrower that there is little likelihood that the borrower can repay the loan.‖55
However, not all scholars or regulators agree that this is the definition of a
predatory loan.56 Some have hesitated to give the term a definition at all,
51 Securitization is the process through which lenders ―sell mortgages to financial intermediaries,
who in turn pool mortgages and sell the cash flows as structured securities.‖ Bernanke, supra note 50.
Securitization began to be widely used ―in the 1980s, and, by 1993, sixty percent of home-mortgage
loans were securitized. . . . It is now routine for lenders to originate loans and sell them to secondarymarket institutions, which provide[s] a steady stream of capital to lend.‖ Engel & McCoy, supra note
34, at 1273–74. For a discussion of the steps in the securitization process, see Eggert, supra note 19, at
538–41. Rapid securitization allows lenders to recoup the money they have lent almost immediately.
Id. at 546.
The lender can [then] use this infusion of capital to make a new round of loans. This quick
churning of loan principal allows even an institution without a great amount of fixed capital
to make a huge amount of loans . . . . [T]his ability to leverage is particularly useful to
smaller, disreputable companies that otherwise would have difficulty funding a large number of loans.
Id. Securitization has mostly done away with long-term relationships between lenders and borrowers.
―In the world of securitization, with its ever churning markets, there are few long term relationships, but
only the financial equivalents of one night stands.‖ Id. at 551; see Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at
652–53; Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 313–20 (2005).
52 ―[T]he practice of selling mortgages to investors may have contributed to the weakening of
underwriting standards. [W]hen an originator sells a loan and its servicing rights, the risks (including,
of course, any risks associated with poor underwriting) are largely passed on to the investors . . . .‖
Bernanke, supra note 50. ―About 56 percent of the home mortgage market is now securitized, compared with only 10 percent in 1980 and less than 1 percent in 1970.‖ Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City‘s
Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 31, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20070831a.htm.
53 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1273–80.
54 ―[E]ven defining a core concept of ‗predatory lending‘ has eluded regulators . . . because, as
with the doctrine of unconscionability, its manifestations are generally context-specific.‖ Azmy &
Reiss, supra note 19, at 649.
55 Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994: Extending Liability for
Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market Participants, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
151, 153–54 (2005) (quoting Eggert, supra note 19, at 511).
56 Since whether a loan‘s terms are predatory is highly fact specific, when New Jersey adopted
the Home Ownership Security Act in 2002, the legislature declined to adopt a definition of ―predatory
lending.‖ Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 649.
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believing that a set definition could prove to be too limiting, as what may
be considered predatory in one loan may not be considered predatory in
another.57 As discussed above, for our purposes, we can define predatory
loans as loans which typically exhibit two or more of the following qualities: (1) terms that can result in great harm to borrowers58, (2) excessive
points and fees59, (3) fraudulent or deceptive lending practices,60 (4) lack of
transparency,61 and (5) terms that require borrowers‘ waiver of ―meaningful
legal redress.‖62 Examples of mortgage terms which exhibit these qualities
may include lending without considering the borrower‘s ability to repay,
financing excessive points and fees, loan flipping, prepayment penalties,
balloon payments, and negative amortization.63 Many of these terms are
regularly used in subprime mortgages, and can adversely affect borrowers.64
1. Lending without Considering Borrowers‘ Ability to Repay Will
Likely Lead to Foreclosure
When lenders make adjustable rate subprime mortgages, they only
consider the borrower‘s ability to repay the loan‘s current monthly payment.65 The lender does not consider whether the borrower will be able to
Id.; Eggert, supra note 19, at 511–13.
Defining ‗Predatory lending‘ is difficult because it encompasses many actions that seem,
on their face, to be indistinguishable from legitimate lending activities. Predatory lending
can be divided into two sets of activities. The first set consists of those activities that are
either clearly illegal or unconscionable by their very nature. These per se improper activities include such actions as misrepresenting the terms of the loans and forging the signatures of borrowers on loan documents.
The second set of activities that make up predatory lending are those that bedevil the regulators of the lending industry: activities that are legal but, when misused by unprincipled
lenders, cause borrowers to pay interest rates and fees higher than the market and the borrowers‘ credit rating would justify. Practices such as balloon payments, adjustable rate
mortgages, rapid refinancing of existing loans, and even high interest rates and fees could
be used in non-predatory loans.
Eggert, supra note 19, at 513. ―[S]ome community activists have brushed definitional issues aside, reasoning that ‗you know predatory lending when you see it.‘‖ Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1260.
58 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1260, 1261–65.
59 Id. at 1260, 1265–67.
60 Id. at 1260, 1267–68.
61 Id. at 1260, 1268–70.
62 Id. at 1260, 1270.
63 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 657–62; Keyfetz, supra note 55, at 155–58; Eggert, supra
note 19, at 515–22. In many situations, these terms can be considered predatory when paired with the
already higher interest rates and points and fees that accompany subprime loans. Azmy & Reiss, supra
note 19, at 655.
64 See SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at 5. ―Subprime mortgages routinely include features that
increase the risk of foreclosure. Such features include adjustable interest rates, balloon payments, prepayment penalties, and loans with limited documentation of borrowers‘ loan qualifications.‖ Id.
65 In recent years, subprime lenders have predominately offered adjustable rate mortgages
(ARMs). ―‗Exploding‘ loans or 2/28s operate as two-year loans that lead to another bad ARM or even
foreclosure after the introductory teaser rate expires. Because subprime lenders typically qualify borrowers based on the introductory payment amount, most borrowers cannot afford to remain in these
arrangements . . . .‖ Ending Mortgage Abuse: Safeguarding Homebuyers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp., and Cmty. Dev., 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of Michael Calhoun, Presi57
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repay the loan when the introductory teaser rate expires, or when the interest rate resets at a higher rate.66 Given that predatory and subprime loans
are often not first mortgages,67 lenders base the amount of the loan on the
amount of equity that the borrower has in his or her home. 68 This practice
of ―asset based lending‖69 is likely to lead to default and foreclosure, robbing the borrower of any equity he or she may have accumulated in his or
her home.70
2. Financing Excessive Points and Fees Disguises the Cost of the
Loan
Predatory and subprime lenders often charge much higher points and
fees71 than are charged for prime loans.72 In addition to carrying higher
points and fees, instead of paying for these in cash, many times borrowers

dent, Ctr. for Responsible Lending) [hereinafter Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony], available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/062304-calhoun-housetestimony.pdf.
66 The Borrower‘s Protection Act of 2007, proposed by Senators Schumer, Brown, and Casey
would ―[r]equire sensible underwriting to ensure that the borrower has the ability to repay a loan, taking
into account payment increases, countering the practice of subprime lenders that underwrite to an artificially low initial ‗teaser‘ rate . . . .‖ Id. at 8.
67 See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 656–57. ―Over 80% of subprime lending—the market
within which predatory lending occurs—is not for the purchase of a home but, rather, primarily for
cash-out refinancings or to consolidate preexisting consumer debt.‖ Id. at 664.
68 Id. at 657; see also Azmy, supra note 51, at 309.
69 Asset based lending is the ―‗pattern or practice‘ of making mortgage loans based solely on the
value of the property securing the loan, without considering the borrower‘s capacity to repay.‖
CURBING, supra note 38, at 5. Asset based lending is particularly problematic when connected to adjustable rate mortgages, which are commonly paired with prepayment penalties. Ruth Simon, Mortgage Refinancing Gets Tougher—As Adjustable Loans Reset at Higher Rates, Homeowners Find Themselves Stuck Due to Prepayment Penalties, Tighter Credit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2007, at D1. In addition
to the prepayment penalties required when refinancing (which can cost thousands of dollars), when
housing prices flatten out, lenders tighten their lending standards, making it more difficult for borrowers
to refinance. Id.
70 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 657; Eggert, supra note 19, at 515. This problem is amplified
by the fact that these loans are no longer in the hands of the brokers who made them. These loans will
have been securitized and the loan will be in the hands of an investor. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note
19, at 657; Eggert, supra note 19, at 515. In sum, this practice is harmful to investors as well as to borrowers.
Subprime mortgage brokers, lenders, securitizers, and investors are operating in a market
that rewards business practices that directly undermine homeowners and sustainable homeownership. Markets function effectively when transactions are likely to benefit all parties involved, but we don‘t have that situation in subprime lending. The unfortunate truth is
that brokers, lenders and investors have reaped enormous gains by originating loans with
payments that explode in two short years, requiring homeowners, like clockwork, to refinance to a new subprime loan. Brokers and lenders benefit from this regular and lucrative
fee income, but homeowners lose the financial benefit of appreciation as their wealth is
stripped away. Worse, when appreciation stops and the families cannot sell or refinance
their homes, these loans bring families to foreclosure and ruin.
Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony, supra note 65, at 2–3.
71 ―Points are fees paid to the lender or broker for the loan . . . . A home loan often involves many
fees, such as loan origination or underwriting fees, broker fees, and transaction, settlement, and closing
costs.‖ FederalReserve.gov, Obtain All Important Cost Information, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/mortgage/mortb_1.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
72 See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 657; Eggert, supra note 19, at 514. ―Many subprime
lenders charge fees totaling eight percent of the loan amount or more.‖ Id.
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finance these points and fees along with the total loan amount. This means
that the high interest rate that already applies to the principal amount of the
loan is now also being applied to the points and fees associated with the
loan.73 Financing points and fees makes it difficult for a borrower to discern the loan‘s true cost.74 The practice of ―loan flipping‖ compounds the
problems associated with excessive points and fees.75
3. Loan Flipping Strips Equity from the Borrower‘s Home
Loan flipping is the practice of repeatedly refinancing a loan ―within a
short period of time with little or no benefit to the borrower.‖76 Borrowers
typically have their loans flipped at the urging of a lender in order to lower
their monthly payments or to consolidate unsecured debt.77 Sometimes
lenders engage in flipping with the awareness that the borrower cannot afford the terms of the new loan, thereby assuring that the borrower will have
to refinance the loan again.78 Lenders engage in this practice in order to
profit from the additional points and fees generated by the new loans.79
These loans progressively strip the borrower of the equity that he or she
had accumulated in his or her home.80 This practice is even more unsettling because excessive refinancing can trap borrowers in an equity-

Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 657.
Id. at 658. ―Financing points and fees may disguise the true cost of credit to the borrower, especially for high interest rate loans.‖ CURBING, supra note 38, at 9. ―Excessive points and fees are
frequently the hallmark of a predatory loan, and they can disguise the real cost of credit when they are
financed rather than paid outright at a loan closing.‖ Promoting Homeownership by Ensuring Liquidity
in Subprime Mortgage Market: J. Hearing Before Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit & Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity, 108th Cong. 5 (2004) (statement of Michael Calhoun, Gen. Counsel, Ctr. for Responsible Lending), available at http://www.responsible
lending.org/pdfs/062304-calhoun-housetestimony.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). Though borrowers
may be able to refinance and escape a high interest rate, homeowners are unable to ever recover excessive fees. ―Instead, those fees are financed into the loan amount and are repaid from the homeowners‘
equity when they refinance. Furthermore, in the subprime market, . . . homeowners may not learn the
total fees they are being charged on a loan until the day of closing, if at all.‖ Id.
75 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 658.
76 CURBING, supra note 38, at 73. See also Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 660.
77 CURBING, supra note 38, at 73. Loan flipping also occurs when borrowers cannot make the
scheduled payments. Id.
When a loan is flipped, a borrower refinances on terms that are not economically beneficial
to him or her, due to the financing of points, fees and prepayment penalties that accompany
such loans. A borrower may receive modest additional funds or a slight reduction in the interest rate, but the points and fees that accompany such transactions in the end make the total transaction more costly to the consumer. For example, reducing a borrower‘s monthly
payment by a small amount, say $30 may cost the borrower thousands of dollars in up-front
costs and interest over the life of the loan. The high fees derived from flipping attract unscrupulous originators who deceive borrowers about the true cost of the loan.
CURBING, supra note 38, at 74.
78 Id. at 74.
79 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 660. It should be noted that ―[l]enders who flip loans tend to
charge high origination fees with each successive refinancing, and may charge these fees based on the
entire amount of the new loan, not on just the incremental amount (if any) added to the loan principal
through the refinancing.‖ CURBING, supra note 38, at 73.
80 Id. at 74.
73
74
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stripping cycle.81 If a loan contains prepayment penalties, even more equity is stripped from the borrower‘s home each time the loan is flipped.82
4. Hidden Prepayment Penalties Make it More Expensive for a
Borrower to Refinance
Prepayment penalties are fees that a borrower is forced to pay if he or
she pays off or refinances the loan before the end of the term. 83 These penalties are designed to decrease refinancing and early payoffs, which both
shrink the lender‘s profits.84 Prepayment penalties are often included in the
amount that is refinanced when a loan is flipped, taking an even bigger
slice out of the borrower‘s equity.85 It has been estimated that eighty percent of subprime loans carry prepayment penalties, yet less than two percent of prime loans carry these penalties.86 Even more troubling is the fact
that borrowers are often not aware that the terms of their loans include prepayment penalties.87 Similarly, many borrowers are also misled about the
existence of balloon payments in their loans.88
5. Balloon Payments can be Used as Leverage to Deplete Borrowers‘
Equity
The term ―balloon payment‖ refers to a lump sum payment that is due
at the end of the loan term. This amount is used to pay off the principal
that the borrower has not yet paid.89 Balloon payments can help borrowers
secure an initial lower monthly payment, but in predatory loans the balloon
payment may be due only three to five years after the loan‘s origination.90
Lenders use upcoming balloon payments as leverage to flip the loan and
generate additional income for themselves.91 Balloon payments are used to
begin or continue equity stripping refinancing cycles.92
81 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 660–61. ―Once a borrower is trapped in this equity-depleting
cycle, it becomes increasingly difficult to escape through refinancing with a legitimate lender on favorable terms.‖ Id.
82 CURBING, supra note 38, at 74.
83 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 658. These penalties are very rare in the prime market, but
seventy percent of subprime loans have prepayment penalties of ―approximately 5% of the total loan
amount.‖ Id.
84 See Eggert, supra note 19, at 518.
85 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 658. ―The Center for Responsible Lending (CLR) estimates
that 850,000 families lose $2.3 billion each year from their home equity wealth because of prepayment
penalties in subprime loans.‖ DEBBIE GOLDSTEIN & STACY STROHAUER SON, CENTER FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING POLICY PAPER NO. 4, WHY PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ARE ABUSIVE IN
SUBPRIME HOME LOANS 3 (2003), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/PPP_
Policy_Paper2.pdf.
86 GOLDSTEIN & SON, supra note 85, at 2; Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 658.
87 GOLDSTEIN & SON, supra note 85, at 8; Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 658.
88 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 661. ―Often, these borrowers were either unaware of the balloon or were given misleading oral assurances that the balloon payments could be easily refinanced.‖
Eggert, supra note 19, at 519.
89 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 661.
90 Id.; see also Eggert, supra note 19, at 519.
91 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 661; Eggert, supra note 19, at 519.
92 See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 661–62; Eggert, supra note 19, at 519.
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6. Negative Amortization Strips Equity Before it is Built
Generally when a borrower makes monthly payments on a loan, that
payment is used to pay a portion of the principal and a portion of the interest.93 ―In a negatively amortizing mortgage, a consumer‘s regularly scheduled payments do not cover the full amount of interest due, causing the
outstanding principal balance to increase.‖94 In essence, the principal does
not decrease over the life of the loan,95 and as a result equity is lost each
month.96 Negative amortization can occur in conjunction with adjustable
rate mortgages that have caps on the monthly payment amounts.97 As with
many of the potentially abusive terms discussed above, ―many borrowers
report that their lenders did not explain how such a loan structure would
work.‖98
C.

These Terms are the Most Abusive When Borrowers are ―Steered‖
into Accepting Them

Freddie Mac estimates indicate that ten to thirty-five percent of subprime borrowers could have qualified for prime loans.99 Many believe that
this indicates that many borrowers were ―steered‖ into subprime loans.100
93 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 662 (―Most loans amortize over the life of the loan with a
resultant diminution of principal.‖).
94 CURBING, supra note 38, at 91.
95 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 662.
96 Id.
97 FederalReserve.gov, Consumer Handbook on Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, http://www.
federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/arms_english.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008). Many adjustable rate mortgages ―limit, or cap, the amount your monthly payment may increase at the time of each adjustment.
. . . Any interest you don‘t pay because of the payment cap will be added to the balance of your loan.‖
Id.
98 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 662.
99 FreddieMac.com, Automated Underwriting Report, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/
reports/moseley/chap5.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2008). ―A recent poll of the 50 most active subprime
lenders supports this conclusion. The survey found that up to 50 percent of subprime mortgages could
qualify as investment-grade mortgages, although some of these loans would fail to meet certain secondary market criteria.‖ Id.
100 GOLDSTEIN & SON, supra note 85, at 4. Disturbingly, it is often minorities being steered into
these subprime loans. ―Nationwide, 50% of all loans in predominately African-American neighborhoods are subprime, compared to only 9% in predominately white neighborhoods.‖ Azmy & Reiss,
supra note 19, at 654–55. The root of this problem could trace back to when redlining. ―Redlining—
categorically restricting or precluding residential lending in minority neighborhoods—was openly practiced by banks and government agencies prior to the Fair Housing Act of 1968.‖ WILLIAM H. SIMON,
THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT 26 (2001). Unfortunately, ―[d]espite that
statute and the subsequent Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1975, studies continue to find that people of
color, or people who reside in predominately minority neighborhoods, are less likely to have success in
applying for credit than white people and people in white neighborhoods in otherwise comparable economic circumstances.‖ Id at 26–27. ―Subprime lending is geographically concentrated in the same
minority neighborhoods once denied access to banks and excluded from federal homeownership programs because of their racial composition.‖ Benjamin Howell, Exploiting Race and Space: Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV. 101, 103–04 (2006). ―The minority concentration of the neighborhood is also positively associated with a higher probability of
receiving a prepayment penalty on a subprime loan.‖ John Farris & Christopher A. Richardson, The
Geography of Subprime Mortgage Prepayment Penalty Patterns, Housing Policy Debate, 687, 712
(2004) available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1503_Farris.pdf. See
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This is troubling because while the prime market has remained relatively
unchanged in recent years, the distinction between the legitimate subprime
market and the predatory market has become extremely blurred. Today,
more and more subprime loans carry terms that were once primarily associated with predatory loans. As discussed above, eighty percent of subprime loans carry prepayment penalties,101 a particularly volatile mix considering that there has been a corresponding rise in adjustable rate
mortgages.102 When lenders make adjustable rate subprime mortgages
without the borrower‘s ability to repay at an adjusted rate, most borrowers
will inevitably have to refinance to be able to afford their monthly payments and will have to pay the prepayment penalties.103 This disregard for
the borrower‘s ability to repay also gives lenders increased potential to flip
the borrower‘s loan.
D.

Lack of Borrower Knowledge Further Blurs the Distinction Between
Predatory and Subprime Loans

Traditionally predatory lenders have targeted borrowers that are not
connected to the credit market in order to exploit the borrower‘s lack of information.104 The terms discussed above may not independently be predatory, but that caveat quickly disappears when they are imposed on uninformed consumers.105 Scholars site the asymmetry of information and
knowledge between borrowers and lenders as highly problematic.106 Exalso, Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony, supra note 65, at 9.
101 GOLDSTEIN & SON, supra note 85, at 2.
102 Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 99 (2005), available at http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=penniur_papers. In 2004, adjustable rate mortgages (―ARMs‖)
accounted for thirty-six percent of the mortgages that year. This has marked the highest percent of adjustable rate mortgages in ten years. Id. at 99–100.
103 Lending Mess, supra note 50. Many ―[ARMs] carried prepayment penalties making it prohibitively expensive for borrowers to refinance when their payments got too high. Buyers qualified based
on the initial low ‗teaser‘ rate, even though they might not be able to shoulder the higher payments that
could come if the rate adjusted upward.‖ Id.
104 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1271. ―These homeowners tend to be very unsophisticated
about mortgage products and largely disconnected from the financial services market.‖ Azmy & Reiss,
supra note 19, at 656.
105 Stark, supra note 9, at 145. Consider:
[I]f the borrower is planning to move and sell the home in three years, then a loan with a
balloon payment due in five years should not be problematic. If the borrower is taking
classes at night and working during the day but expects to graduate and has a high-paying
job waiting for her in a year, then a loan that accrues interest at a higher rate than it is payable at for a one-year period (causing negative amortization) would not be problematic and
may best suit that particular borrower‘s needs.
Id.
106 See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1271; Memorandum from Richard K. Green &
Susan M. Wachter, on The Housing Finance Revolution to the Federal Research Bank of Kansas City‘s
31st Economic Policy Symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyo. 34–35, 38–41 (Aug. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2007/PDF/2007.08.21.WachterandGreen.pdf. In a recent study published by the Woodstock Institute, an alarming thirty-four percent of borrowers did not
know whether their loans carry a fixed or adjustable interest rate. Many Borrowers Unaware of Mortgage Interest Rate Details; Foreclosures Affect Neighbors, Too, WOODSTOCK DEV. (Woodstock Inst.,
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ploitation of unequal knowledge and information is becoming equally problematic in the subprime industry,107 and this has caused many subprime
loans to have the same ending as their predatory counterparts—
foreclosure.108
II. CURRENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION HAS NOT BEEN ENOUGH TO
PROTECT BORROWERS
A.

The Truth in Lending Act

In 1968, the federal government enacted the Truth in Lending Act
(―TILA‖)109 ―as title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. . . . TILA,
implemented by Regulation Z (12 CFR 226), became effective July 1,
1969.‖110 TILA was passed in order to ensure that lenders disclose credit
terms to borrowers in a way that allows them to compare the terms of credit
that they have been offered.111 TILA requires that the lender disclose certain terms to the borrower including the amount financed, finance charges,
the annual percentage rate (―APR‖), a statement whether the payments may
―increase or decrease dramatically,‖ and the total number of payments.112
Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2007, at 1, available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/publications/woodstockdevelopments-newsletter.
107 Kenneth R. Harney, Mortgage Forms Sow Confusion, WASH. POST, June 23, 2007,
http:www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/22/AR2007062200867_pf.html).
―Many borrowers simply do not understand their mortgages—especially subprime loans that come with
complex features and costly penalties.‖ Id.
In a series of intensive interviews . . . researchers also found that ‗many borrowers were
confused by the current . . . mortgage cost disclosures‘ . . . .
Many had loans that were significantly more costly than they believed, or contained significant restrictions, such as prepayment penalties, of which they were unaware.
Id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM‘N, BUREAU OF ECON. STAFF REPORT, IMPROVING CONSUMER
MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE
FORMS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2007) available at www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505Mortgage
Disclosureexecutivesummary.pdf [hereinafter IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES].
108 Keyfetz, supra note 55, at 157–58 ―There is a strong connection between the growth and concentration of subprime lending and increases in foreclosures—not just in recent weeks, but in recent
years.‖ What We Need is a Meaningful, National Standard for Mortgage Underwriting, WOODSTOCK
DEV. (Woodstock Inst., Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2007, at 3, available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/
component/option,com_docman/Itemid,260/task,cat_view/gid,98/.
109 15 U.S.C.S. § 1602 (2005).
110 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, TRUTH IN LENDING: COMPTROLLER‘S
HANDBOOK 1 (2006), available at http://www.occ.gov/handbook/til.pdf [hereinafter COMPTROLLER‘S
HANDBOOK].
111 Id. at 4.
112 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638 (2005). It should be noted that TILA does not fully address advertising
issues that arise in the subprime loan context. Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of
Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 129–30 (2007). McCoy writes:
Advertisements featuring low introductory rates on variable-rate loans—known as ‗teaser
rates‘—raise other difficulties that TILA fails to fully resolve. Under TILA, an advertisement touting a teaser rate must state how long the teaser rate lasts and advise readers that
the APR could rise after consummation. However, nothing in TILA requires an ad to describe the rate increase, its limits, or how it would affect the payment schedule. This allows lenders to entice borrowers with promises of low interest without revealing how high
their interest rate could eventually go.
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Home Ownership Equity Protection Act of 1994

Congress amended TILA to include the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act of 1994 (―HOEPA‖) in order to help combat predatory lending.113 HOEPA requires additional disclosures and imposes ―substantive
limitations on certain closed-end mortgage loans bearing rates or fees
above a certain percentage or amount.‖114 HOEPA provisions are triggered
in two cases. First, HOEPA provisions are triggered when the initial APR
is 8% higher than the yield on Treasury securities for first-lien mortgages
with comparable maturity periods, or that are 10% higher for subordinatelien mortgages.115 Second, the provisions are triggered when the points and
fees that the consumer will pay at or before the closing are greater than 8%
of the entire loan amount or $400.116
For mortgages subject to HOEPA, some of the disclosures that lenders
must make to borrowers include: the APR; the amount of regular payments
and any balloon payments; the total amount borrowed; and for adjustable
rate mortgages, a statement that the APR and monthly payments may increase.117 ―HOEPA prohibits negative amortization without exception, balloon payments on loans with terms of less than five years, [and] loan terms
that increase the interest rate in the event of a default . . . .‖118 HOEPA,
however, does not apply to mortgages used to purchase homes or to home
equity credit lines, and has been criticized by many consumer advocates
due to the high amounts required to trigger HOEPA‘s protections.119 These
high trigger amounts allow many lenders to evade compliance with
HOEPA by making loans that fall just below the amounts which trigger
HOEPA‘s protections.120
As illustrated by the current foreclosure rate, the disclosure requirements mandated by HOEPA and TILA are not enough to protect consumers
or to give them enough information to make informed credit decisions.121
Id. at 129.
113 Press Release, Federal Reserve Board, Home Equity Lending Market; Notice of Hearings
[Docket No. OP-1288] (May 29, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
20070529b.htm.
114 COMPTROLLER‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 110, at 2.
115 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2007); see also Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 666.
116 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(ii) (2007); see also Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 666. Note, the
$400, is adjusted annually to reflect inflation. Id.
117 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(1)–(5) (2007).
118 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 666.
119 Id. at 667; Stark, supra note 9, at 144.
120 Stark, supra note 9, at 144. Stark is also critical of the main protections that the HOEPA offers
overall. She claims that these protections are inadequate, citing required disclosures that borrowers do
not understand or read as an example. Id.; see Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony , supra
note 65, at 6–7.
121 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 665–68. ―[TILA] fails to include more obvious and less
technical disclosures that traditionally unsophisticated victims of predatory lending need. . . . [T]he disclosures that TILA does require need only be made at the loan closing . . . . The disclosures are also too
confusing where they come included in a bewildering stack of loan documents.‖ Id. at 665–66; see supra note 106.
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In a recent Federal Trade Commission study of prime and subprime loans
that met current federal disclosure requirements, two-thirds of borrowers
did not detect the sizeable penalty that would be incurred for refinancing
within the first two years.122 Further, a Consumer Federation of America
study from 2004 concluded that borrowers ―most likely to purchase complex ARMs were among the least likely to understand these products.‖123
Many states have recognized the inadequacies of the current federal protections and mandated disclosures, and have enacted their own laws in order
to curb lending abuses and to fill in the gaps left open by federal law.124
III. SOME STATES HAVE ENACTED THEIR OWN LAWS THAT
REQUIRE CONSUMER EDUCATION IN ORDER TO COMBAT
PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES
In 1999, North Carolina was the first state to try to cure the failures of
the federal legislation and passed its own anti-predatory lending statute.125
Since then, many states have passed some form of legislation intended to
curb predatory lending.126 One of the unique features of North Carolina‘s
law is that it requires consumer education when loans contain certain
terms.127 Only a handful of states have mirrored the requirement of con122 Harney, supra note 107; see generally IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES, supra note 107.
123 The Federal Government’s Role in Empowering Americans to Make Informed Financial Decisions Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, the Fed. Workforce, and the District of Columbia of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Insurance Corporation), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spapr3007.html.
124 See Christopher R. Childs, Comment, So You’ve Been Preempted—What are You Going to Do
Now?: Solutions for States Following Federal Preemption of State Predatory Lending Statutes, 2004
BYU L. REV. 701, 703.
125 Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can
Protect Elders from Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 711 (2003).
126 Id. at 712–14. It should be noted that there are federalism and preemption issues associated
with the states enacting their own anti-predatory lending statutes. ―The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (‗OCC‘) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (‗OTS‘) have, via administrative fiat, aggressively pushed preemption of state laws for national banks and savings associations, especially since
1996.‖ Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing Debt Burdens of
Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 175 (2007). This
had impacted the states‘ abilities to enforce their own predatory lending laws. ―The preemption rights
accorded federal depositories by the OTS and the OCC make it very difficult for states to protect their
consumers from abusive practices in the credit marketplace. For example, OCC and OTS decisions
have trumped state anti-predatory lending laws enacted in recent years.‖ Id. at 175–76. This allows
―national banks, federal savings associations, and their operating subsidiaries [to] almost completely
ignore these state laws.‖ Id. at 176. It should be noted that the application of New Jersey‘s Home
Ownership Security Act of 2002 is ―preempted by federal law from applying to federal savings associations.‖ Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, Regarding Preemption of New Jersey Predatory Lending Act (July 22, 2003), available at http://www.ots.treas.
gov/docs/5/56305.pdf. A full discussion of federalism and preemption issues that accompany individual states‘ anti-predatory lending would go beyond the scope of this Comment. For discussion regarding
preemption issues with regards to North Carolina‘s predatory lending law, see C. Bailey King, Jr.,
Preemption and the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 377 (2004). For
discussion of preemption issues and state predatory lending statutes, see Childs, supra note 124.
127 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(c) (LexisNexis 2007).
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sumer education in their anti-predatory lending statutes.128 In 2002, New
Jersey followed North Carolina‘s lead and included a consumer education
requirement in its Home Ownership Security Act,129 and in 2006 Illinois
began a pilot program requiring credit counseling for some borrowers.130
The laws of these three states appear to have varying degrees of success,
but they all reflect the belief that informed borrowers are important in
combating abusive lending practices.131
A.

North Carolina was the First State to Recognize the Power of an
Informed Consumer

One of the main purposes behind North Carolina‘s anti-predatory
lending statute is to promote public awareness by providing ―education and
counseling about predatory lenders.‖132 The North Carolina anti-predatory
lending statute prohibits a lender from making a high-cost home loan133
without first receiving certification that the borrower has received homeownership counseling.134 Commentators have celebrated North Carolina‘s
law because it has not impinged on subprime borrowing.135
128 Consumer education has not been able to show its strengths in combating predatory lending
because subprime lenders have largely been able to avoid the items that trigger the protection of these
states‘ acts. Stark, supra note 9, at 146. ―Although five states have enacted mortgage counseling requirements for high-cost home loans, because the triggers for this protection are set at such high levels,
they have become another reform to avoid rather than comply with.‖ Id.
129 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(g) (West Supp. 2007).
130 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70 (West Supp. 2007).
131 See supra notes 31, 32, 107, 162.
132 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332.
133 A ―high-cost home loan‖ is defined as a loan where: (1) the principal amount of the loan does
not exceed the lesser of the conforming loan size limit for a single-family dwelling that is established by
Fannie Mae, or $300,000, (2) the borrower is a natural person, (3) the debt the borrower incurs is mainly for personal family, or household purposes, (4) the loan is secured by either a security interest in a
manufactured home that the borrower does or will occupy as her principal dwelling, or a mortgage or
deed of trust on real estate where there is or will be a structure, or structures, designed for one to four
families‘ occupancy, which is or will be occupied by the borrower as her principal dwelling, and (5) the
loan exceeds one or more of the thresholds in section 6. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-1.1E(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2007).
134 ―A lender may not make a high-cost home loan without first receiving certification from a
counselor approved by the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency that the borrower has received
counseling on the advisability of the loan transaction and the appropriate loan for the borrower.” Id. §
24-1.1E(c)(1).
135 ―Without question, North Carolina has reduced predatory lending. At the same time, evidence
shows borrowers in North Carolina continue to have access to a wide variety of competitively priced
loans from a wide variety of lenders.‖ CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CRL POLICY BRIEF NO.
10, SUPPORT H.R. 1182: THE PROHIBIT PREDATORY LENDING ACT 1 (2005), available at http://
www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/pb010-MillerWattFrank-0305.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). The
anti-predatory lending statute has not reduced the number of subprime loans made in North Carolina, in
fact, ―North Carolina had 15% more subprime home loans per capita than the rest of the nation as a
whole in 2000.‖ Id. at 2. ―[T]he subprime market behaved essentially as the law intended: There was a
reduction in predatory loans but no change in the cost of subprime credit or reduction in access to credit
for high-risk borrowers.‖ Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impact of North Carolina‘s Anti-Predatory
Lending Law: A Descriptive Assessment 1 (June 25, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Ctr. for Cmty. Capitalism, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill), available at http://www.responsiblelending.
org/pdfs/PredLendingStudy.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). It should be noted that North Carolina‘s
statute prohibits high cost home loans from carrying any of the following terms: (1) No call provisions
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It should be noted that recent statistics show that North Carolina has
not been able to dodge the foreclosure wave that has hit the rest of the nation.136 The number of foreclosures in North Carolina has not been attributed to the failure of consumer education programs, and may be connected to the thresholds which must be met in order to trigger the statute‘s
provisions.137 In fact, the North Carolina Justice Center still recommends
that ―investment . . . in programs designed to promote responsible homeownership, such as housing counseling and financial literacy‖ be considered in order to fight against the problem of increased foreclosures in
North Carolina.138
B.

New Jersey Included a Consumer Education Requirement in the Home
Ownership Security Act of 2002

New Jersey sought to combat the state‘s high concentration of predatory lending by enacting the Home Ownership Security Act of 2002.139
The Act ―bans numerous additional loan terms when made in connection
with High-Cost Home Loans,[140] such as balloon payments, negative
amortizations, and default interest rates, while also mandating clear disclosures and, in certain cases, loan counseling.‖141 New Jersey requires loan
counseling142 when a borrower will be financing points and fees in connecthat allow the lender to unilaterally to accelerate the borrower‘s indebtedness, (2) No balloon payments
that exceed the sum of two average earlier scheduled payments, (3) No negative amortization, (4) No
increased interest rate triggered by default, (5) No advance payments, (6) No modification or deferral
fees, (7) No lending without lender‘s reasonable belief that the borrower will be able to repay the loan,
(8) Fees and charges may not be directly or indirectly financed, (9) Lender may not charge additional
points and fees when refinancing an existing high-cost home loan held by the same lender. N.C. GEN.
STAT. Ann. § 24-1.1E(b)–(c) (LexisNexis 2007).
136 In 2006, there were 46,512 foreclosures filed in North Carolina. ―This level represents an increase of over 173 percent from the 16,630 filings in 1998.‖ Al Ripley, A Good Session Addressing
Foreclosure: But More Work Remains, N.C. JUST. CENTER COMMUNITY NEWS, Fall 2007, at 6, available at http://www.ncjustice.org/assets/library/1072_cnfall2007.pdf. Data also shows that the number of
foreclosures in 2007 will surpass those of 2006. ―Many experts predict that nationwide the height of
the crisis will not peak until 2008 or 2009 . . . .‖ Id. The record number of foreclosures has sent North
Carolina legislators back to the drawing board to search for a way to combat predatory lending. In
2007, the General Assembly of North Carolina passed House Bill 1817 ―to protect North Carolinians
from predatory mortgage lending practices that increase foreclosure.‖ Id.
137 Stark argues that, like HOEPA, the triggers for the statute‘s protection are set so high that
lenders can avoid compliance with the statute. Stark, supra note 9, at 146.
138 Hearing on Home Foreclosures Before the H. Select Comm. on Rising Home Foreclosurses,
2005–09 Reg. Sess. (N.C. Feb. 28, 2006) (statement of Carlene McNulty, Staff Attorney, N.C. Just.
Ctr.) available at http://www.ncjustice.org/assets/library/670_ncjcforeclosepres.pdf.
139 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(g) (West Supp. 2007); see also Azmy & Reiss, supra note
19, at 649.
140 The statute defines a ―High-cost home loan‖ as a loan where the principal amount does not
exceed $350,000, ―which. . . shall be adjusted annually to include the last published increase of the
housing component of the national Consumer Price Index, New York-Northeastern New Jersey Region,
in which the terms of the loan meet or exceed one or more of the thresholds as defined in this section.‖
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (West Supp. 2007).
141 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 671–72; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(a)–(g) (West
Supp. 2007).
142 It should be noted that there is a difference between consumer education and consumer counseling. ―Counseling is specific and is tailored to the particular needs of the individual, while education
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tion with a High-Cost Home Loan.143 While consumer counseling is only
required for loans where borrowers will be financing points and fees, creditors can not make any High Cost Home Loan without the borrower first
signing a notice that urges the borrower to contact a credit counselor.144
Scholars projected that the Home Ownership Security Act would curb the
―worst abuses of predatory lending while preserving the availability of credit to all New Jersey consumers who need it.‖145 Unfortunately, New Jersey has also been unable to avoid a growing number of foreclosures in recent years.146 Despite the growing number of foreclosures, the New Jersey
Department of Banking and Insurance continues to focus on the importance
of an educated and informed public.147
C.

Illinois Enacted Legislation that Requires Mandatory Counseling for
Certain Loans

Illinois enacted House Bill 4050148 in an attempt to ―eradicate predatory lending practices. HB 4050 [was] designed to increase homeowner‘s
knowledge about the loans they are considering and to reduce the number
of foreclosures resulting from overly expensive homes.‖149 The statute
provides that brokers or loan originators of mortgages on residential properties within the pilot program area,150 must submit the information retypically is administered in a generic program.‖ HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 33, at 5.
143 § 46:10B-26(g). The New Jersey legislature found that ―[t]he financing of points and fees in
these loans provides immediate income to the originator and encourages the repeated refinancing of
home loans.‖ § 46:10B-23(a). Identifying the connection between the financing of points and fees and
repeated refinancing, a known predatory term as discussed above, may have motivated the legislature to
require consumer counseling with respect to this loan term.
144 ―You [the borrower] should consult an attorney-at-law and a qualified independent credit
counselor or other experienced financial advisor regarding the rate, fees and provisions of this mortgage
loan before you proceed. A list of qualified counselors is available by contacting the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance.‖ § 46:10B-26(f) (original in all caps).
145 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 670.
146 Based on the number of homes in the state in May 2007, New Jersey had the fifteenth highest
number of foreclosures in the country—approximately ―one foreclosure filing for every 843 households . . . .‖
Kathleen M. Howley, U.S. Mortgage Foreclosure Filings Rise 90% in May,
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 12, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
av3bqU7edFDs&refer=home. This statistic was drawn from information provided by RealtyTrac, Inc.
Id.
147 The Department of Banking and Finance announced in September 2007 that it would be
launching additional education and counseling programs to address and prevent foreclosures. Commissioner Steven M. Goldman stated, ―Educating and informing the public is the best defense against business arrangements with potentially catastrophic consequences.‖ Press Release, State of New Jersey
Department of Banking and Insurance, DOBI Announces Public Forums, Education Plan to Address
Mortgage Lending Issue: Focus on Consumer Education, Foreclosure Prevention (Sept. 26, 2007)
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/pressreleases/pr070926.htm.
148 H.B. 4050, 94th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005).
149 HB4050info.com, Homepage, http://www.hb4050info.com/Public_Web/home.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
150 The ―Pilot Program Area‖ is defined by statute as ―all areas within Cook County designated as
such by the Department [of Financial and Professional Regulation] due to the high rate of foreclosure
on residential home mortgages that is primarily the result of predatory lending practices.‖ 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70(a) (West Supp. 2007). Originally the pilot program area consisted of ten zip
codes in Cook County. HB4050info.com, Introduction to the Predatory Lending Database Pilot Pro-

DE TAL

2008]

11/10/2008 3:04 PM

Knowledge is Power

653

quired by statute151 to the predatory lending database established and administered by the Secretary of the Department of Financial and Professional
Regulation (―DFPR‖)152 within ten days of taking a mortgage application.153 After reviewing the information, the DFPR will issue a ruling within seven days, stating whether the borrower must undergo mandatory credit
counseling.154
Though foreclosure rates in Illinois and Cook County still remain
high,155 HB 4050 only went into effect on January 1, 2006.156 Since the
statute did not go into effect until then, many of the loans that led to the foreclosures in 2007 were not subject to the statute.157 Further, it should be
gram, available at https://www.hb4050info.com/pdfs/HB4050_intro.pdf. However, after receiving information that suggested that this designation ―may be detrimental to the Pilot Program‘s purpose,
namely, to curb predatory lending practices in areas with high rates of foreclosure on residential home
mortgages[,]‖ the Secretary of the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (the ―Secretary‖) withdrew that designation. Press Release, Illinois Dept. of Fin. & Prof‘l Regulation, ReDesignation of Pilot Program Area Pursuant to Public Act 94-280 (HB 4050) (Jan. 19, 2007),
https://www.hb4050info.com/pdfs/4050Scan001.pdf. The Secretary withdrew the designation and designated that the Pilot Program Area had no areas or zip codes. Id. Some critics had claimed that the
originally designated area was a result of racism. See Amy Merrick, Illinois Tries New Tack Against
Predatory Loans: Its First Effort Drew Charges of Racism; Mortgage Brokers Revolt, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 21, 2007, at A1. A further examination of this claim goes beyond the scope of this Comment.
151 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/72 (West Supp. 2007). The information required includes information about the borrower, such as name, address, social security number, the mortgage‘s interest
rate and related material terms, information about the loan originator or employer including license
number and fees being charged to the borrower as well as ―[a]ll information indicated on the Good
Faith Estimate and Truth in Lending statement disclosures given to the borrower by the broker or originator.‖ Id. § 77/72(6).
152 § 77/70(b).
153 § 77/70(c).
154 Id. The law requires that the Department create a database for the loan applications that it
receives. The database would collect information from all of the loans issued in the Pilot Areas. ―Under the program, mortgage companies and brokers must enter information about the borrower and the
borrower‘s loan into the Internet-based database. This database will be able to automatically analyze
the details of each loan and determine if the loan agreement meets credit counseling standards set by the
Department.‖ Press Release, Governor‘s Office, Gov. Blagojevich Signs Law to Protect Homebuyers
in At-Risk Communities From Predatory Lenders (July 21, 2005), http://www.illinois.
gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=3&RecNum=4166 [hereinafter Press Release,
Law to Protect Homebuyers]. The determination shall be based on the Department‘s comparison of the
information provided and the Department‘s credit counseling standards. Id. If the Department determines that the borrower must undergo counseling, this requirement may not be waived by the borrower.
Id.
155 From January to June of 2007, there were 42,998 foreclosures filed in Illinois, one for every
120 households. Press Release, RealtyTrac.com, Foreclosure Activity up Over 55 Percent in the First
Half of 2007 (July 30, 2007), http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?
ChannelID=9&ItemID=2932&accnt=64847. ―Cook County reported 3,721 foreclosure filings in May
[2007], a 27 percent decrease from the previous month but still the most of any county in the [Chicago]
metro area.‖ Press Release, RealtyTrac.com, Chicago Foreclosure Activity Decreases 20 Percent in
May (June 30, 2007), http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=
9&ItemID=3011&accnt=64847. ―The county‘s foreclosure rate of one foreclosure filing for every 563
households was sixth highest among metro counties and 1.2 times the national average.‖ Id.
156 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70 (West Supp. 2007).
157 Many of the foreclosures that are occurring now are due to the interest rates of ARMs being
reset. See supra notes 12, 17 and accompanying text; SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at 5. Until recently,
2/28 ARMs were the most common type of subprime loan. Holden Lewis, Popular 2/28 Mortgages are
No More, BANKRATE.COM, July 26, 2007, http://biz.yahoo.com/brn/070726/22748.html?.v=1. ―A 2/28
subprime ARM has a low initial rate that lasts two years. After that, the loan resets, which means that
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noted that HB 4050 was enacted after, and in response to, the large number
of foreclosures in Cook County.158 In fact, HB 4050 was an attempt to curb
the number of foreclosures and help families harmed by loans that they did
not understand.159
D.

These Laws Strive to Give Borrowers the Knowledge Necessary to
Avoid Abusive Loan Terms

Though foreclosure statistics since the enactment of North Carolina,
New Jersey, and Illinois‘ respective anti-predatory lending statutes may not
initially indicate success, these states are definitely on the right track.160 In
the Center for Responsible Lending‘s 2006 report assessing state predatory
lending laws, New Jersey and North Carolina were listed among the states
with the strongest predatory lending laws.161 Consumer counseling and
education is aimed at curing the problems caused by unequal information
and knowledge possessed by borrowers and lenders.162 These states aim to
provide borrowers with the knowledge they need to avoid abusive loan
terms while still allowing borrowers to make the ultimate decision about
how to invest.163
Eleven HUD certified counseling agencies participated in the HB
4050 Predatory Lending Database Pilot Program during the twenty-week
period between September 1, 2006 and January 19, 2007.164 In the Pilot
Program‘s twenty weeks, about 1,200 borrowers received credit counseling, or a ―File Review,‖ from a HUD-certified counseling agency.165 ―The
overwhelming majority of borrowers who were receiving adjustable-rate
the rate is adjusted upward or downward. At the first jump, the rate can conceivably climb 2 to 6 percentage points, causing monthly payments to skyrocket.‖ Id.
158 In 2003 Cook County had more foreclosures than any other U.S. county. Sarah Max, The Next
Big Trend: Foreclosure, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 5, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/2004/02/04/pf/
yourhome/foreclosures/index.htm.
159 Press Release, Law to Protect Homebuyers, supra note 154. ―A recent analysis by The Chicago Reporter, an investigative newsmagazine, found that the Chicago area ranks first among United
States metropolitan areas in the number of subprime loans issued to homeowners from 2004 through
2006.‖ Morgenson, supra note 1.
160 See supra notes 137, 155–159 and accompanying text (discussing potential reasons why North
Carolina and Illinois‘ statutes may have failed to produce a decrease in the numbers of recent foreclosures).
161 Wei Li & Keith S. Ernst, The Best Value in the Subprime Market: State Predatory Lending
Reforms, CRL REPORT (Ctr. Resp. Lending, Durham, N.C.), Feb. 23, 2006, at 7, available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr010-State_Effects-0206.pdf. States were evaluated using
HOEPA‘s protections as a baseline and then by considering six aspects of a ―typical subprime loan: (1)
types of loans covered, (2) treatment of points and fees, including covered charges and amount of
charges that activate high-cost protections, (3) prepayment penalties, (4) anti-flipping rules, (5) substantive protections applicable to high-cost loans, and (6) remedies available to borrowers.‖ Id. at 6.
162 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
163 ―Nothing in this Article is intended to prevent a borrower from making his or her own decision
as to whether to proceed with a transaction.‖ 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70(i) (West Supp. 2007).
164 Findings From the HB 4050 Predatory Lending Database Pilot Program, HOUSING ACTION
ILL. (Housing Action Illinois, Chicago, Ill.), Apr. 4, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.
housingactionil.org/downloads/HB4050Findings.pdf [hereinafter Findings HB 4050].
165 Id.
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loans were surprised when the HUD-certified Counseling Agency informed
them that they were receiving an adjustable-rate loan and not a loan with a
fixed rate for the entire term of the loan.‖166 The counseling agencies‘ research indicates that borrowers who received counseling were better able to
―understand the costs and terms of their loans, leading to better-informed
decision-making.‖167 These findings correspond with those in a 2001
study, which found that pre-purchase mortgage counseling is effective in
reducing the number of delinquent mortgage payments.168
IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENACT FEDERAL
LEGISLATION REQUIRING CONSUMER EDUCATION WHEN A
MORTGAGE CONTAINS CERTAIN TERMS
The federal government should enact legislation requiring borrowers
to participate in a consumer education program before borrowers can
commit to a loan that contains an adjustable interest rate, prepayment penalties, or balloon payment(s); a loan that does, or has the potential to, negatively amortize; or a loan in which points and fees will be financed along
with the principal.169 Requiring borrowers to complete a consumer education program will give borrowers the tools necessary to understand the
meaning of each of these terms, as well as their potential benefits and dangers. At the completion of all consumer education programs, extra one-onone counseling should be made available to all borrowers who desire additional assistance in understanding the terms of their loans. The federal
government forces subprime lenders to face an educated consumer by requiring consumer education when these terms are present.170 Giving borrowers information and education will help to eliminate the asymmetry of
knowledge between borrowers and lenders, which has been cited as one of
166 Id. at 3. It appears that when lenders told borrowers that the term of the mortgage was fixed
they did not reveal that the term was only fixed for a short amount of time. ―Truth in Lending Act
(TILA) disclosures do not adequately disclose this to the unsophisticated borrower. . . . Most borrowers
also did not understand that they were being charged substantial fees/costs for the loan.‖ Id. at 4.
167 Id. at 1.
168 HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 33, at 3.
169 It has been argued that, ―it is important to emphasize that prevention, including counseling and
education, is never a substitute for strong regulation. Education is not a panacea as long as creditors are
allowed to push dangerous, unaffordable credit on the most vulnerable.‖ Loonin & Renuart, supra note
126, at 197; see also Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony, supra note 65, at 7. It should be
noted that this Comment does not contend that only consumer education should be used to prevent predatory and abusive loan terms, but merely that its potential for success and inherent strengths should not
be overlooked.
170 State and federal laws have been criticized because the triggers that evoke the laws‘ protections
are set too high. Stark, supra note 9, at 144–46. Triggers further encourage lenders to simply avoid the
triggers rather than comply with the laws. Id. at 146. As Malcolm Bush, President of the Woodstock
Institute, notes, in calling for national underwriting standards: ―Previous laws failed to prevent the problems we are now seeing for a very straightforward reason. The nature of predatory lending is such that
any attempt to regulate specific products or practices simply serves as an impetus for unscrupulous
lenders to develop new methods for preying on vulnerable home owners.‖ Malcolm Bush, What We
Need is a Meaningful, National Standard for Mortgage Underwriting, WOODSTOCK DEV. (Woodstock
Inst., Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2007, at 3, available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/component/
option.com_docman/Itemid,260/task,cat_view/gid,98/.
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the largest driving forces behind predatory lending practices.171 Moreover,
having the consumer education requirement tied to specific loan terms rather than interest rate or fee triggers, helps to ensure that lenders cannot
avoid compliance.172
Some have criticized consumer education and counseling because it
puts the ―burden of the problem on the victim . . . .‖173 This Comment‘s
proposal should not be viewed as forcing borrowers to shoulder additional
burdens when taking out loans with certain terms; it should be viewed as
empowering borrowers by giving them the tools necessary to assess risk174
and make informed financial decisions. Exotic mortgages175 should be
available to consumers who decide to enter into them with full knowledge
of their potential consequences.176 Federal implementation of a basic consumer education requirement would be most efficient and ensure that all
states have a basic education requirement.177 This would allow lenders to
still offer exotic mortgages, but would assist borrowers in making more informed decisions.178 Despite the criticism that has been directed at the consumer education requirement in the bankruptcy system, a consumer education requirement for home mortgages would have advantages179 and has
been shown to help reduce mortgage delinquencies.180 One of the easiest
ways to ensure compliance with a consumer education requirement would
be to require that lenders show proof that borrowers have completed the re171 Engel and McCoy argue ―that today‘s home-mortgage market is replete with information
asymmetries that predatory lenders have exploited to the detriment of borrowers who are disconnected
from the credit market.‖ Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1271. A twenty-week study of Illinois HB
4050 conducted by eleven HUD-Certified Counseling Agencies revealed that ―[b]orrowers tend to trust
what they are told by their loan originator and do not understand what is written in the voluminous disclosures given to them.‖ Findings HB 4050, supra note 164, at 3. ―Additionally, borrowers often operate under the mistaken presumption that their loan originator has an obligation to obtain the best loan
and interest rate for them.‖ Id. at 4. ―Buying or refinancing a home is the biggest investment that most
families ever make, and particularly in the subprime market, this transaction is often decisive in determining a family‘s future financial security. The broker has specialized market knowledge that the borrower lacks and relies on.‖ Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony, supra note 65, at 8.
172 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
173 Stark, supra note 9, at 131. ―A solution founded on education or counseling puts the onus on
potential victims to avoid predatory-loan terms, rather than on the perpetrators. Such reliance is nothing
more than caveat emptor served up with an informational brochure or loan counseling.‖ Engel &
McCoy, supra note 34, at 1310–11.
174 ―[R]isk means the chance that something different than expected will happen.‖ ERIC A.
CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 44 (2006). For borrowers, foreclosure
should be something different than what is expected to happen when they take out a mortgage.
175 Exotic mortgages are mortgages with non-traditional terms, such as adjustable interest rates,
prepayment penalties, balloon payment(s), negative amortization, or financed points and fees.
176 Maxed Out, a documentary on debt in America, begins with a realtor in Las Vegas discussing
how she had taken out a ―loan to value‖ mortgage to build a large custom home. She admits that, if the
―interest rate goes up by the time we move-in in April, I might not be able to afford the house anymore.‖ MAXED OUT (Magnolia Home Entertainment 2006). This is a markedly different situation
from a borrower who has entered into a loan, not even knowing that his/her loan carries an adjustable
interest rate.
177 See infra notes 182–186 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
179 See infra Part IV.B.
180 See HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 33, at 3.
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quired consumer education before they are allowed to securitize their loans
and sell them on the secondary market.181
A.

Federal Legislation Should Establish a Baseline for the Consumer
Education Requirement

The consumer education requirement proposed in this Comment
should be federally enacted, but it should only be viewed as a baseline for
the states to follow. Though this approach may not be favored by multistate lenders due to potential variances between states,182 it is favorable to
purely federal legislation and to legislation that is left solely to the states
for a number of reasons. Implementing the consumer education requirement in this manner ensures that all states will have an efficient consumer
education requirement.183 Further, because the federal legislation provides
only a baseline, states will be allowed to pass stricter legislation if they believe it is necessary. For example, states may add additional terms which
would also require consumer education. This allows the states some level
of freedom to experiment and gives each state the ability to account for its
individual needs.184 This proposal may be workable as an amendment to
existing federal law, such as the TILA,185 or it may require an entirely new
piece of legislation. In addition to federal implementation of the consumer
education requirement, the federal government should provide the states
with federal funds to implement the consumer education requirement.186
Some of the main concerns of requiring a consumer education requirement are how to fund this education, and how to find and train enough
educators.187 This Comment proposes that the federal government bear the
costs of the consumer education programs, since the requirement will be
federally mandated and cannot be waived by borrowers whose loans contain certain terms.188 One possible way for the government to fund and implement this requirement would be for the federal government to allot an
additional budget to the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(―HUD‖) for consumer education programs.189

181 The ease of securitization of loans has led to the boom in the subprime market and the growth
of predatory lending practices. See supra Part I.A.
182 ―Lenders would prefer a uniform approach . . . because with a uniform law, multi-state lenders
will have only one set of rules to comply with, making compliance with the law easier and cheaper to
administer.‖ Stark, supra note 9, at 150.
183 Stark argues for a uniform federally enacted mortgage counseling intervention requirement,
noting that it is preferable to the state-by-state approach, because ―consumer advocates fear that in light
of the current holders of national office, it is unlikely that as effective a law will be enacted as might be
enacted by certain states.‖ Id.
184 Cf. id. at 150–51 (arguing that a uniform federal requirement would be preferable to a state-bystate approach).
185 Stark‘s article proposes consumer counseling as an amendment to the TILA. Id. at 150.
186 Id. at 141.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 141–42.
189 Id.
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Currently, HUD has already approved housing counseling agencies
across the country.190 Having HUD develop uniform counseling criteria—
to be adjusted to suit stricter state laws if necessary191—for these already
approved counseling agencies to adopt, may be one of the easiest and most
efficient ways for a consumer education requirement to be implemented.
Though additional educators may still need to be trained,192 the existence of
an already established network of counselors would cure some of the initial
burden during the implementation stage of the consumer education requirement.193 This pre-existing network of government-approved housing
counselors would put a consumer education requirement for mortgages
steps ahead of the consumer education and counseling requirements in the
bankruptcy system.194
B.

Though Consumer Education has not been Successful in Bankruptcy,
it can Succeed in Protecting Borrowers
In 2005, Congress reformed the bankruptcy system. 195 The new law,

190 For a listing of HUD-approved housing counseling agencies, see HUD.gov, HUD Approved
Housing Counseling Agencies, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hcc/hcs.cfm (last visited Mar. 15,
2008). There are over 125 approved housing counseling agencies in California alone. See id.
191 Should states enact stricter legislation in addition to the federal legislation, the states should be
expected to make budgetary contributions to account for the additional counseling that will have to be
given in that state.
192 Since the education requirement cannot be waived, additional counselors who speak languages
other than English will need to be trained in some locations. Some of the approved housing counseling
agencies in the current HUD network offer services in languages other than English, and some do not.
See HUD.gov, Find a Housing Counselor, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hcc/hccprof14.cfm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2008). Being able to provide services in languages other than English is of vital importance in some regions in the United States, particularly considering evidence which shows a correlation
between a borrower‘s inability to read or speak English and his/her vulnerability to predatory lending
practices. See, e.g., C. Lincoln Combs, Comment, Banking Law and Regulation: Predatory Lending in
Arizona, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 617, 623 (2006). Combs‘ article notes the trend in Arizona, where the state‘s
immigrants from Latin America and Mexico have become targets of predatory lending. One of the
main reasons that these people have been targeted by predatory lenders is because ―they are often not
able to read the documents in English that are presented to them to sign . . . .‖ Id.
193 During the twenty-week study of Illinois HB 4050 conducted by eleven HUD-Certified Counseling Agencies, there were forty-one counselors trained to provide the Bill‘s required File Review.
―All borrowers referred for File Review were able to schedule and complete the File Review with a
participating HUD-certified Counseling Agency within the 10-day statutory time frame.‖ Findings HB
4050, supra note 164, at 2. Moreover, ―[t]here were no documented delays in the closing of loans because of a lack of counselors or delays in providing the File Review.‖ Id.
194 See infra notes 206–09 (discussing criticism of the lack of direction given to US trustees regarding training and qualification of bankruptcy counselors).
195 Loonin & Renuart, supra note 126, at 186. See also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). ―BAPCPA . . . [is] the most substantial revision of bankruptcy law since the 1978
Bankruptcy Code. BAPCPA generally became effective as to cases filed on or after October 17, 2005.‖
Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 31. ―By
the early 2000s, more people filed for bankruptcy each year than suffered a heart attack. More filed
bankruptcy than were diagnosed with cancer. More filed bankruptcy than graduated from college. . . . Americans filed more petitions for bankruptcy than for divorce.‖ Elizabeth Warren, A New
Conversation About the Middle Class, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 119, 120 (2007). Due to the overwhelming number of Americans filing for bankruptcy each year, BAPCPA was enacted in order to prevent
abuse of the bankruptcy system and its protections and to make affordable credit more accessible. Press
Release, The White House, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection Act
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the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(―BAPCPA‖), made many significant changes to American bankruptcy
law.196 One of the major changes BAPCPA made to the Bankruptcy Code
was the addition of consumer counseling and consumer education requirements.197 First, to be able to qualify as a debtor under BAPCPA, individuals must now receive consumer counseling, in the form of a briefing, within
180 days of filing for bankruptcy.198 This briefing can take place in a oneon-one or group setting, and can be done over the phone or the internet.199
―Specifically, the credit briefing must outline opportunities for credit counseling, provide a budget analysis, and provide an analysis of financial conditions, factors that caused such financial conditions, and how the debtor
can develop a plan of action for dealing with the debt without incurring
negative amortization of debt.‖200 Second, in order to be able to qualify for
discharge, debtors must also complete a personal financial management
course.201
Congress enacted the consumer education and counseling requirements of BAPCPA in response to concerns that consumers were filing
bankruptcy in cases when it was not their only option.202 BAPCPA‘s con(Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov./news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html.
Scholars and practitioners have expressed doubt that these goals can be achieved through BAPCPA and
have sharply criticized the law. ―BAPCPA likely prevents bankruptcy abuse if only because it limits
the number of people eligible to file for bankruptcy protection. By reducing the number of overall
bankruptcy filings, BAPCPA likely curbs abusive bankruptcy filings. Of course, . . . BAPCPA also
prohibits good faith filers from obtaining bankruptcy relief, leaving them at the mercy of their creditors
and state exemption laws.‖ Alan D. Eisler, The BAPCPA’s Chilling Effect on Debtor’s Counsel, 55
AM. U. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2006). See generally David K. Stein, Comment, Wrong Problem, Wrong
Solution: How Congress Failed the American Consumer, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 619 (2007).
196 Wedoff, supra note 195, at 31.
197 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 109(h), 111 (West 2007).
198 § 109(h); see also Wedoff, supra note 195, at 36; Martin & Tama y Sweet, supra note 20, at
518; Karen Gross and Susan Block-Lieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity for Innovation? Pre-Petition
Credit Counseling and Post-Petition Financial Management Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
549, 550 (2005). ―Under new § 109(h), individuals are ineligible for relief under any chapter of the
Code unless, within 180 days of their bankruptcy filing, they received ‗an individual or group briefing‘
from a nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency approved by the U.S. trustee or bankruptcy administrator . . . .‖ Wedoff, supra note 195, at 36 (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(1) (West 2007)). There
are some narrow exceptions for this requirement set forth in 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(4).
199 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(1) (2007); Wedoff, supra note 195, at 36.
200 Martin & Tama y Sweet, supra note 20, at 518. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(1)(a) (2007).
201 11 U.S.C.A. § 111 (2007); Wedoff, supra note 195, at 37; Gross & Block-Lieb, supra note
198, at 551. Some narrow exceptions for this requirement are also set forth in 11 U.S.C.A. §109(h)(4)
(2007). ―According to the instructions distributed by The Executive Office of the United States Trustee
(‗EOUST‘) and memorialized in the Code of Federal Register, the entity charged with administering
this requirement, the course must cover at least three areas of instruction: budget development, money
management, and the wise use of credit.‖ Martin & Tama y Sweet, supra note 20, at 519.
202 Michael Newman, BAPCPA’s New Section 109(h) Credit Counseling Requirement: Is It Having the Effect Congress Intended?, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 489, 489–92. ―Congress‘s intent in enacting the
new credit counseling provisions of BAPCPA was thus to encourage individual consumer debtors to
consider bankruptcy a ‗remedy of last resort,‘ by forcing debtors to learn about the consequences of
filing bankruptcy and the available non-bankruptcy alternatives.‖ Id. at 490–91. ―[BAPCPA] contains
several provisions that seek to improve consumers‘ financial literacy in an attempt to decrease the total
number of future bankruptcy filings.‖ Id. at 489 (quoting 151 CONG. REC. E685, E704 (2005) (statement of Rep. Moore)).
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sumer education and counseling requirements have received a great deal of
criticism for a variety of reasons. Considering that the debtor is already on
her way to file her bankruptcy petition, one of the main concerns is whether
the required briefing203 to obtain debtor status will be effective.204 Further,
it is argued that this requirement prevents people who would otherwise
qualify for bankruptcy from being able to file for relief.205
Another large concern is the lack of direction given to the Executive
Office of the United States Trustee regarding how to approve the private
non-profit organizations that have been charged with the task of implementing the mandatory pre-bankruptcy counseling.206 In the past, the credit
counseling industry was funded by the consumer finance industry, but this
has ended and, as a result, more aggressive consumer counseling agencies
have emerged.207 This has led to a litany of potential dangers for consumers who seek the help of these agencies, including ―deceptive marketing,
high pressure sales efforts, high fees and practices inconsistent with the
best interests of their consumer customers.‖208 Congress, aware of these
problems in the credit counseling industry, still decided to require that everyone seeking to file bankruptcy receive counseling from an approved
agency.209
Though the consumer education and counseling requirements of
BAPCPA have been widely criticized, requiring consumer education or
counseling for mortgages that carry certain specified terms could avoid
many of these criticisms. First, and probably most importantly, the counseling will take place before the borrower enters into the mortgage agreement.210 The timing of pre-purchase counseling distinguishes it from prebankruptcy consumer counseling for debtors. Pre-purchase counseling for
borrowers takes place when borrowers still have the ability to decide not to
enter into a mortgage, which is dramatically different from pre-bankruptcy
counseling which takes place after consumers have already made credit decisions that have led them to the brink of bankruptcy.211 More importantly,
11 U.S.C.A. §109(h) (2007).
Martin & Tama y Sweet, supra note 20, at 540. ―[I]t is highly questionable whether any debtor
education on the way into bankruptcy will be effective. . . . It is simply too late, at that point, to meaningfully affect any decision a debtor could make.‖ Id.
205 ―Given the timing and the stress levels of a person facing financial crisis, the first course serves
no useful function. Importantly, this requirement also keeps deserving people out of bankruptcy.‖ Id.
at 519.
206 See Gross & Block-Lieb, supra note 198, at 553–58.
207 Id. at 554.
208 Id. Even though these are non-profit agencies, some ―function as virtual for-profit businesses,
aggressively advertising and selling DMPs [(debt management programs)] and a range of related services, maintaining close ties to for-profit firms, [and] reaping high revenues . . . .‖ Id. at 555.
209 Id. at 558.
210 Timing plays a large role in borrower education and counseling. Pre-purchase counseling and
education tends to be ―designed to better prepare families for the responsibilities of homeownership by
explaining the home buying and financing process, encouraging financial planning and money management, and going over home maintenance and repair issues and concerns.‖ HIRAD & ZORN, supra
note 33, at 5.
203
204

211
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it has been shown that pre-purchase consumer counseling and education
does have a significant impact on mortgage delinquency rates.212 Promoting lender compliance is also an integral component to ensuring that consumers are receiving the knowledge necessary to navigate the complicated
terms in today‘s subprime mortgage market. One way to prompt lenders to
adhere to this requirement would be to require proof that the borrower has
completed the required consumer education program before lenders are allowed to securitize the loan.
C.

Precluding Lenders from Securitizing Loans where Borrowers did not
Participate in the Required Consumer Education will Promote
Compliance

As discussed above, the boom in the subprime market is largely attributable to the rise in securitization of mortgages.213 One of the biggest criticisms of subprime lending is that, due to securitization, loan originators do
not have a reason to closely scrutinize the loans‘ anticipated future performance.214 Since lenders are able to quickly sell their loans on the secondary market, lenders have become less concerned with borrowers‘ potential
future defaults.215 As a result, securitization has led to relaxed underwriting
standards.216 To prevent abusive lending practices there has been a call for
[I]t is likely that some—perhaps many—debtors‘ financial situations will have so deteriorated before they seek prebankruptcy credit counseling that bankruptcy is their only recourse. A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study reports that anecdotal evidence suggests just that: By the time debtors seek prebankruptcy credit counseling,
their financial situation is dire enough to allow few alternatives to bankruptcy . . . .
NOREEN CLANCY & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, PREBANKRUPTCY CREDIT COUNSELING 2 (2007), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/reports_studies/docs/Pre-Bankruptcy_Credit_Counseling
_Report_Rand.pdf.
212 ―Borrowers receiving individual counseling experience a 34 percent reduction in [90-day] delinquency rates. . . . [C]lassroom and home study counseling [reduce these delinquency rates by] 26
percent and 21 percent . . . respectively.‖ HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 33, at 2. It should be noted that
the data for this study came from loans originated from 1993 to 1998, and the authors note that, since
counseling and education techniques have progressed since then, ―[i]t is likely that these changes have
improved counseling‘s effectiveness, and therefore our analysis likely underestimates the benefits of
current counseling programs.‖ Id. at 18–19. Further, unlike BAPCPA, it should be noted that this
Comment‘s proposal does not allow for telephone or internet education. Telephone counseling and
education have not been shown to effectively reduce delinquency rates. Id. at 18.
213 See supra notes 19, 51, 181; see infra notes 214, 216.
214 SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at 5. ―Lenders shield themselves from the full potential cost of
foreclosures by selling their loans to investors through the secondary mortgage market. Together, thirdparty originations and the risk dispersion made possible through the secondary market help distance
loan originators from seriously adverse consequences of foreclosures.‖ Id. Securitization also helps
lenders to avoid legal responsibility for predatory loans. ―A legal doctrine called the ‗holder in due
course‘ rule shields [the] loan assignee and ultimately the investors against liability for the predatory
nature of the loans.‖ Loonin & Renuart, supra note 126, at 178–79.
215 Eggert, supra note 19, at 550.
216 Id. at 550–51. ―[S]ecuritization has encouraged the decline of stringent underwriting.‖ Id. at
550. The effect that securitization would have on the underwriting standards has been around for some
time. In a 1989 article, Edward Pittman wrote, ―Today, approximately half of the private whole loan
pass-through market is comprised of limited documentation loans. The increasing use of such loans,
among other things, has been cited by some commentators as evidence of deterioration in the quality of
securities that are being created.‖ Edward L. Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affect-

DE TAL

662

11/10/2008 3:04 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 11:633

more strictly enforced underwriting standards217 and greater investor accountability.218 Requiring lenders to show proof that a borrower has participated in the federally mandated consumer education program before the
lender is able to securitize the loan would help serve these goals.
If a borrower has completed the consumer education courses, she
should be in a position to assess the risks of her proposed investment, and
will have been given the ability to contact an additional counselor if she has
questions or concerns regarding her loan. These tools will enable the borrower to make an informed decision as to whether she should enter into a
particular loan. If borrowers have undergone this process, then investors
would be able to invest in mortgage-backed securities knowing that borrowers have assessed the risks of the loan,219 therefore giving investors increased confidence that their investments are not furthering predatory lending practices.
If a borrower has not participated in consumer education, the lender
will be precluded from securitizing the loan. This will force the lender to
endure the consequences if the borrower should default on her mortgage in
the future. Since it would not be in the lender‘s best interest for the borrower to default on the loan while the lender was still holding it in his portfolio due to the time and expense related to foreclosure proceedings, lenders would most likely reform underwriting standards or ensure that
borrowers participate in the required consumer education courses to help
them understand the terms of their loans.

ing Mortgage Related Securities, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 546 (1989). Today, scholars are still
critical of the effects of securitization on underwriting standards. ―Lax underwriting standards magnify
the risk of loans that already include high-risk features. Subprime lenders who market exploding
ARMs and other high-risk loans often do not adequately consider whether the homeowner will be able
to pay when the loan‘s interest rate resets, even if rates stay constant.‖ SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at
5.
217 Bush, supra note 170, at 3.
218 ―Investors should take reasonable steps to avoid supporting unsound lending, including refusing to purchase mortgages from lenders who make abusive loans and requiring that subprime lenders
use appropriate underwriting standards to ensure that borrowers can repay the loan.‖ SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at 31.
219 Moral hazards should be considered. ―In general, a moral hazard is the risk that a party with
discretion to act will choose an action that decreases the expected value of the transaction to the other
party in a way that the other party cannot effectively prohibit.‖ CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 174, at 86. A
full discussion of moral hazards and subprime loans would go beyond the scope of this Comment. But,
briefly, one might claim that one of the main moral hazards to the lender is that a borrower may not care
that there is a high probability of foreclosure associated with the mortgage and go through with the
transaction anyway. A response to this argument could be that lenders can control this moral hazard by
tightening their underwriting standards.
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CONCLUSION
Consumer education can work. Illinois‘ law, HB 4050,220 made Mr.
Alvaro Cortez a believer.221 In December of 2006, Mr. Cortez found his
dream house and went through the counseling sessions mandated by HB
4050.222 A loan counselor worked with Mr. Cortez and taught ―him how to
verify his mortgage‘s terms.‖223 Mr. Cortez believes that his counseling
―helped him stand up for himself when he went to his closing. There. . .the
paperwork showed that he had an adjustable-rate loan, instead of the fixedrate one he had been promised. The interest rate also was higher than he
agreed to pay. Mr. Cortez refused to sign.‖224 On Mr. Cortez‘ second closing date, the loan documents still did not reflect the loan he had been promised and he refused to sign once again.225 At the third closing, Mr. Cortez
finally signed loan documents reflecting the loan that he was promised.226
A federally mandated consumer education requirement would curtail
abusive lending practices since lenders would not be as easily able to exploit borrowers‘ lack of knowledge of mortgage terms. To increase lender
accountability and ensure their compliance with the consumer education
requirement, lenders should be required to prove that borrowers have completed the mandatory education in order to securitize their loans. If the
federal government were to implement a consumer education requirement
for mortgages containing certain terms that have been commonly associated with predatory lending and are now prevalent in subprime loans, like
Mr. Cortez, many borrowers would learn the skills necessary to protect
themselves.

220

Codified as 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/1, et seq. (West 2007); see also Merrick, supra note

221
222
223
224
225
226

Merrick, supra note 150.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

150.
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